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ABSTRACT—The state’s imposition of compulsory terms in property
relations—such as habitability warranties binding landlords and tenants and
minimum wages binding employers and employees—has long been
conceived by analysts generally situated on the political right as an affront
to individual freedom and inevitably harmful to the terms’ intended
beneficiaries. This critique, though, seems to have special purchase in public
discourse today not only within its traditional circle of supporters on the right
but, at least in some instances, for a sizable number on the left as well. The
bipartisan acceptance of this critique is serving as a substantial roadblock to
a wide range of reforms to the property system that take aim at resource
inequities. Breathing life into these types of reform efforts, therefore,
necessarily will require a renewed counterassault on this going critique’s
foundations. Building on and contemporizing central insights of the legal
realist and critical legal studies movements, this Essay explores some of the
key characteristics of those circumstances in which the state’s compelling
terms in social and market relationships surrounding property may well be
justified on deontological or consequentialist grounds. In so doing, the Essay
seeks to generate momentum toward a renewed discourse that eschews kneejerk opposition to compulsory terms in property in favor of one that engages
with the rationales for and against such terms in a context-sensitive fashion.
AUTHOR—Professor of Law and Chancellor’s EDGES Fellow, Texas A&M
University School of Law. Thank you to Vanessa Casado Pérez, Eric
Freyfogle, Nadav Shoked, Joseph W. Singer, and Laura Underkuffler for
their insightful feedback on earlier versions of this manuscript. Thanks, too,
to Ashley Hedrick and Finnegan, Jack, and Elliott Mulvaney for their love
and support.
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INTRODUCTION
In a recent report titled Big Government Policies that Hurt the Poor,
analysts affiliated with the Heritage Foundation’s Institute for Economic
Freedom asserted that opportunities abound for America’s poor to “lift
them[selves] out of poverty” if only “the government would just get out of
the way.”1 Among a series of alleged instances of untoward state intrusions,
the report offers the common trope that “if a worker produces $12 an hour in
value for a firm, he will receive close to $12 an hour [in wages]. But with
mandatory $15 starting wages, the firm will lay him off.”2 “[G]overnment
regulation and unwarranted intervention,” the report’s authors conclude, are
“an attack on individual freedom” and “the primary barriers to progress.”3
The noted focus of this report’s ire—a minimum wage—is an example
of what this Essay considers a compulsory term in property: a statedetermined, nonwaivable right, privilege, or duty that exists upon and as a
result of parties entering into a specific contractual relationship regarding
access to resources. These contractual relationships, affecting both real and
personal property, are broadly construed herein to include employer–
employee, landlord–tenant, creditor–debtor, merchant–consumer, and the
like. The Heritage Foundation report’s critique that compulsory terms of this
nature are an affront to individual freedom and inevitably will hurt their

1
DAREN BAKST ET AL., BIG GOVERNMENT POLICIES THAT HURT THE POOR AND HOW TO ADDRESS
THEM 1 (Darren Bakst & Patrick Tyrrell eds., 2017), https://www.heritage.org/poverty
-and-inequality/report/big-government-policies-hurt-the-poor-and-how-address-them [https://perma.cc/
WF3H-VNLP].
2
Id. at 13.
3
Id. at 9, 24.

192

117:1 (2022)

Compulsory Terms in Property

intended beneficiaries is by no means new;4 however, this critique seems to
have special purchase in public discourse today, not only within its
traditional circle of supporters generally situated on the political right5 but,
at least in some circumstances, for a sizable number on the left as well.6
The bipartisan acceptance of this critique serves as a substantial
roadblock not only to the minimum wage increases on which the Heritage
Foundation report concentrated but to a wide range of other reforms to the
property system that take aim at resource inequities.7 Breathing life into these
types of reform efforts, therefore, necessarily will require a renewed
counterassault on this going critique’s foundations. Building on and
contemporizing central insights of the legal realist and critical legal studies
movements, this Essay explores some of the key characteristics of those
circumstances in which the state’s compelling terms in social and market
relationships surrounding property may well be justified on deontological or
consequentialist grounds.
The Essay proceeds as follows. Part I suggests that the standing
argument against compulsory terms in property is constituted by three
familiar core elements: a specific conception of freedom, an understanding
4
See Ilana Waxman, Hale’s Legacy: Why Private Property Is Not a Synonym for Liberty,
57 HASTINGS L.J. 1009, 1010 (2006) (“During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it was
legal orthodoxy that property owners had a natural right to use their property as they wished, and that
state interference with that prerogative threatened the very basis of individual liberty.”).
5
See, e.g., Nathan Mayo, A $15 Minimum Wage Would Hurt Those It’s Meant to Help, CNN
BUSINESS (Feb. 9, 2021, 9:42 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/09/perspectives/15-minimum-wagebiden-hurt/index.html [https://perma.cc/4UTA-2PNY]; Dan Hannan, Minimum Wages Hurt the Poor,
WASH. EXAMINER (Feb. 22, 2021, 12:00 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/
minimum-wages-hurt-the-poor [https://perma.cc/2YT3-W7ES]; Brad Polumbo, Democrats Are Wrong:
A $15 Minimum Wage Will Hurt the Marginalized, Not Uplift Them, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 9, 2021, 1:18
PM), https://www.newsweek.com/democrats-are-wrong-15-minimum-wage-will-hurt-marginalized-notuplift-them-opinion-1567975 [https://perma.cc/8EXD-CPNM]. Among academics, Robert Ellickson has
been perhaps the foremost challenger to the implementation of compulsory terms in property relations
over the past forty years. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of “Inclusionary” Zoning, 54 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1167 (1981); Robert C. Ellickson, Rent Control: A Comment on Olsen, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
321 (1991); Robert C. Ellickson, The False Promise of the Mixed-Income Housing Project, 57 UCLA L.
REV. 983 (2010); Robert C. Ellickson, The Untenable Case for an Unconditional Right to Shelter,
15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17 (1992).
6
According to one of New Jersey’s highest ranking Democrats in the aftermath of a fall 2021 election
cycle that saw gains for Republican candidates, Democrats have heard the call that “voters are frustrated
by mandates and government overreach” and will respond accordingly. See Susanne Cervenka, Gopal
Claims Victory in NJ 11th District Senate: ‘This Should Be a Big Wake Up Call,’ ASBURY PARK PRESS
(Nov. 5, 2021, 2:52 PM), https://www.app.com/story/news/politics/elections/2021/11/05/vin-gopalelection-results-nj-11-district-senate-assembly-race/6300811001/ [https://perma.cc/U5BB-RJWS].
7
By way of example, consider how very few inclusionary housing programs require developers to
ensure that more than 20% of new residential units are affordable. See Emily Thaden & Ruoniu Wang,
Inclusionary Housing in the United States: Prevalence, Impact, and Practices 48 (Lincoln Inst. of Land
Pol’y, Working Paper No. WP17ET1, 2017).
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of the state as a paternalistic interventionist, and a view of the market as a
decidedly private realm in which voluntary bargains between individuals
maximize personal satisfaction in the aggregate. Parts II and III present a
counterstance that, in direct correspondence with the constitutive elements
of the standing oppositional view, emphasizes respect for competing
conceptions of freedom, the contradictions of antipaternalistic expressions,
and the promotion of just markets. The articulation of this counterstance is
not to deny that compulsory terms in property may breed inefficiencies,
distribute resources in ways that exacerbate extant inequalities, or alter
individual choices that are better left unaltered. It is, rather, to contend that
compulsory terms in property are not inherently problematic but instead, in
the right circumstances, can provide general structural supports for the
operation of a private property system and achieve specific situational
successes in confronting property inequalities. The Essay offers the modest
conclusion therefrom that knee-jerk opposition to compulsory terms in
property is best replaced by engagement with the rationales for and against
such terms in a context-sensitive fashion.
I.

STANDING OPPOSITION TO COMPULSORY TERMS
IN PROPERTY RELATIONS

As a threshold matter, it must be acknowledged that, at a broad level of
generality, all law can be construed as compulsory. For purposes of this
Essay, though, compulsory terms are understood to include those
nonwaivable Hohfeldian correlatives—namely, rights–duties, privileges–no
rights, and powers–exposures—that arise as a result of parties entering into
a specific contractual relationship regarding access to resources.8 They
might, for instance, involve singling out a specific right that must be included
in a specific type of contract and thereby imposing a duty on one party to the
benefit of another (for example, compelling landlords to include a
habitability warranty in residential leases for the benefit of tenants). Or they
might involve outlawing the inclusion of a specific right in a specific type of
contract—i.e., affording no right—and thereby privileging parties from the
duty owed that right (for example, precluding sellers from requiring buyers
to obtain their consent before the sale of a traditionally subdivided lot to a
third party). Alternatively, they might involve affording power to some
parties to make a specific demand of other parties and thereby exposing that
latter class to an alteration of their market position (for example, providing
8
See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913) [hereinafter Hohfeld, Judicial Reasoning I]; Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 710
(1917) [hereinafter Hohfeld, Judicial Reasoning II].

194

117:1 (2022)

Compulsory Terms in Property

sellers of condominium units the right of first purchase upon buyers’
decisions to sell). These terms can arise out of almost any lawmaking form,
from judicial interpretation of constitutional provisions or the common law
to statutory or regulatory pronouncements.9
The standing opposition to these compulsory terms in property takes a
variety of nuanced forms. Such assorted strands, though, are tied together by
what are now familiar, interrelated understandings of freedom, paternalism,
and markets. From the perspective of those who support this oppositionist
view—and admittedly painting with very broad strokes—this Part sets out
these familiar understandings in turn.
A. Freedom
How do we conceptualize what it means to be free? From the
perspective of those who endorse the conventional opposition to compulsory
terms in property relations, freedom, as John Stuart Mill preached, is
characterized by individuals’ ability to chart the course of their own lives.10
This ability is a critical sentiment in American culture. The Declaration of
Independence, after all, deems it “self-evident” that we hold the “unalienable
Right[]” to our own “pursuit of Happiness.”11 A morally just society, in
Mill’s terms, treats people as autonomous beings who are free to choose their
own pathways in the course of this pursuit.
This conception of freedom underpinning the oppositionist’s view has
three tenets at its core: (1) persons cannot be forced to contract over resources
and labor when they choose not to do so; (2) persons can contract over
resources and labor when they choose to do so; and (3) enforcing contracts
over resources and labor to which people voluntarily agree by definition
9
In light of its focus, this Essay naturally does not address the extent to which it is the judiciary’s
role to modernize outdated common law rules to accord with general policies underlying legislation
enacted in a given area. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Glassboro Serv. Ass’n, 415 A.2d 1156, 1158, 1163 (N.J.
1980) (holding—in reliance on the state legislature’s decision to afford traditional tenants process prior
to eviction and “progressive attitude in providing legal protection for migrant farmworkers”—that an
employment arrangement in which such workers live in barracks on their employer’s land, though not a
traditional landlord–tenant arrangement, implicitly includes a mandatory provision that terminated
employees have a “reasonable opportunity to find shelter before dispossession”).
10
JOHN STEWART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Batoche Books Ltd. 2001) (1859) (“Over himself, over his
own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.”); see also Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A
Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293, 293 (1975) [hereinafter Epstein, Unconscionability]
(defending the freedom of contract over the doctrine of unconscionability to guarantee individuals a
“sphere of influence . . . without having to justify themselves to the state or to third parties”); R ICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 59 (1995) (stating that the autonomy principle in
property ownership results in “human happiness and productivity”); RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND
FREEDOM xiii (1999) (conducting a historical analysis to test the hypothesis that there is an intimate
relationship between “public guarantees of ownership and individual liberty”).
11
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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serves the interests of the parties to those contracts by giving them what they
want.12 On these premises, our society is divided into a private realm in which
individuals act and a public realm in which the state acts. It follows that, in
the private realm, individuals make choices to buy, sell, trade, lease, and
license property and property-adjacent resources with one another. Publicrealm actions by the state generally are, in turn, relevant in the private realm
only to the extent that they create negative duties to avoid harming others or
enforce affirmative duties to which individuals voluntarily have bound
themselves via contracts with other individuals.13 Any further state actions
are inherently interventionist and coercive.14
On this view, property owners are generally understood as being able
to use their property as they wish, even if that use interferes with the interests,
needs, or expectations of others. When individuals make the aforementioned
choices to buy, sell, trade, lease, and license property, they largely do so on
their own terms. Individuals, that is, are the primary allocators of property
interests.15 As the allocators of property interests, they are thus immunized
from having their property bought, sold, traded, leased or licensed on terms
that subvert their individual will.16 If property is unequally distributed, that
generally is a mere product of the individual choices freely made in the
private realm. Thus, according to the oppositionists, inequalities in
bargaining power that result from the unequal distribution of property are not
a threat to freedom but thoroughly consistent with it.17 That certain parties
hold less bargaining power than others does not denigrate those parties’
status as the best assessors of what they value and what trade-offs they want
to make.18
B. Antipaternalism
Determining what we, as individuals, value and are open to trading off
necessarily involves subjective judgments regarding the pathways to

12
See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 568–69 (1982).
13
See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685,
1728–29 (1976).
14
See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 12, at 569.
15
Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN.
L. REV. 1189, 1189 n.1 (1985).
16
Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND
THE LAW: NOMOS XXIV 3, 20 (1982).
17
Gary Peller, Privilege, 104 GEO. L.J. 883, 889 (2016).
18
See Alan Schwartz, Justice and the Law of Contracts: A Case for the Traditional Approach,
9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 107, 107 (1986) (asserting that “just outcomes arise when people are
permitted to do the best they can, given their circumstances”).
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achieving our own happiness.19 To the oppositionists, compulsory terms take
those judgments out of individuals’ hands on the basis of a specific
substantive moral vision to which those individuals do not necessarily
subscribe.20 This course, they suggest, is particularly repugnant where
compulsory terms reflect a perceived knowledge on the part of the state of
what is best for the same parties—racial and ethnic minorities, the indigent,
the disabled, etc.—whom the state has so routinely and magnificently
oppressed across our nation’s history.21
Consider, for instance, the New Jersey supreme court’s decision in
Vasquez v. Glassboro Service Ass’n to require employers to house migrant
farmworkers fired from their jobs for poor performance while the employers
go to court to evict those workers from barracks on the employers’ property.22
To the oppositionist, injecting such a compulsory term into the employment
arrangement hurts those workers who work the hardest. On this view,
workers who are confident in their ability to perform their employment tasks
may well be happy to confer on the employer the right to summarily
terminate and eject them in exchange for, say, higher wages or better
working conditions, for they deem the possibility of summary termination
and ejectment a nullity given their work ethic. It necessarily follows
therefrom that the Vasquez court’s decision to determine the terms of the
contract for them will paternalistically deprive these workers of the freedom
to do the best they can for themselves in their circumstances.
C. Markets
The foregoing Section suggested that, according to the oppositionists,
antipaternalism promotes the particular deontological conception of freedom
outlined in the Section that preceded it. But, on the oppositional view,

19
Robert Nozick deemed liberalism inherently associated with antipaternalism, R OBERT NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 58 (1974), as Bruce Ackerman meticulously explained. BRUCE
ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 10–12 (1980).
20
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387,
1430–31 (1987) (describing child labor laws as “misguided initiatives that inflict[] harm upon the very
persons they were ostensibly intended to benefit,” for children who cannot sell their labor may well be
put to “[a]rduous labor, day and night,” in the home); Claire A. Hill, Anti-Anti-Anti-Paternalism, 2 N.Y.U.
J.L. & LIBERTY 444, 449–50 (2007) (“Anti-paternalists seem ready to concede, at least for argument’s
sake, that people might make mistakes and lack self-control. But they think what people choose still offers
the best guide to what they really want, so that their choices should be respected.”).
21
See, e.g., Walter Williams, Black Americans Don’t Need White Guilt-Driven Paternalism,
ORANGE CNTY. REG. (June 26, 2020, 2:55 AM), https://www.ocregister.com/2020/06/26/blackamericans-dont-need-white-guilt-driven-paternalism-walter-williams/ [https://perma.cc/9K4H-8GWA]
(“Black people should be simply left alone as opposed to being smothered by the paternalism inspired by
white guilt.”).
22
415 A.2d 1156, 1158 (N.J. 1980).
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antipaternalism also advances a utilitarian objective: affording individuals
extensive liberties to make decisions regarding their own property promotes
an efficient allocation of resources.23 Pareto-optimal exchanges—those that
benefit at least one party and make no parties worse off—exist because
people have different preferences.24 Voluntary exchanges on the open
market, then, the oppositionists suggest, both get the right resources and
services into the hands of the people who value them most and get the right
people working in the right jobs to maximize productivity.25 It follows, on
this view, that compulsory terms prevent some of these otherwise-inevitable
beneficial exchanges from occurring by denying people the opportunity to
advance their own interests via contractual relationships.26
Take, for a classic example, the implied warranty of habitability in
residential leases. Where economically rational landlords are compelled to
warrant the habitability of property leased for residential purposes, the
oppositionist resolves that these landlords will be forced to raise the rent to
offset the costs of providing that warranty or step away from the residential
leasing market altogether, even when there are prospective tenants who
would have preferred a lower rent and no such habitability warranty.27 In this
way, compulsory terms—with the limited exception of those aimed at
mitigating clear external impacts on third parties—regularly hurt the parties
they were intended to benefit by restricting these parties’ ability to engage in
voluntary exchanges in pursuit of the things that they want.28
It is true, the oppositionist might concede, that, in some instances,
parties in the weaker bargaining position advocate in the political realm for
compulsory terms. Tenants’ rights groups were, after all, front and center in
pushing for the habitability warranty in the late 1960s and early 1970s,29 and
23
POSNER, supra note 5, at 13; Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON.
REV. 347, 356 (1967).
24
See Epstein, Unconscionability, supra note 10, at 293.
25
Id.; RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
61 (1985); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11–21 (2004).
26
Cf. Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1754–55 (2004)
(asserting that affording owners the freedom to make their own bargains is socially advantageous because
they are, due to their familiarity with the resources they own, best positioned to determine those resources’
best uses).
27
Daniel P. Schwallie, The Implied Warranty of Habitability as a Mechanism for Redistributing
Income: Good Goal, Bad Policy, 40 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 525, 525 (1989) (“[T]he warranty of
habitability results in scarcer, more expensive housing for the poor.”).
28
For a narrow conception of externalities, see, for example, Donald J. Boundreaux & Roger
Meiners, Externality: Origins and Classifications, 59 NAT. RES. J. 1, 3 (2019) (concluding that “the
instances in which policy actions are justified to deal with what are purported to be externalities are
very small”).
29
See David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99 CALIF. L. REV.
389, 392 (2011).
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in recent years we have seen a similar groundswell in the context of workers’
rights.30 Consider, for instance, the wage context: workers’ rights groups are
in the midst of a renewed push for increases in the federal minimum wage
from the extant $7.25/hour for nontipped workers and $2.13/hour for tipped
workers.31 But to the oppositionists, such advocacy rests on the misguided
belief that employers will not react in the market realm to the inclusion of
that term by demanding concessions from workers on other variables in the
same way that the push for a habitability warranty improperly assumed that
landlords would not demand concessions from tenants. According to this
oppositional view, wages are determined by the property rights of employers
and the ability of workers to convince employers that sharing those rights is
worth more to employers than it costs.32 Bargaining in the market realm most
accurately and transparently determines, they suggest, what work is worth.33
From this perspective, if workers are being paid a low amount, that is
because there are others ready, willing, and able to work for those same
wages, and those persons do not have enough to offer their employers to
justify paying them more.34 On this view, regulations, such as those declaring
a minimum wage, rest atop the market model and generally serve to interfere
with the otherwise free and clear choices made therein. It follows that where
compulsory terms of this nature are baked into every deal, employers and
prospective workers will either negotiate over other terms to reach an
arrangement that is less appealing than the one they would have reached in
the absence of such constraints or fail to reach an arrangement at all.35 To the
oppositionists, raising the minimum wage prompts some businesses to shut
down and others to roll back benefits and reduce hiring, a deadly one-two

30
See, e.g., Kai Ryssdal & Richard Cunningham, Is a New Labor Movement Brewing?,
MARKETPLACE (Oct. 1, 2021), https://www.marketplace.org/2021/10/01/is-a-new-labor-movementbrewing/ [https://perma.cc/U88U-C4BM] (noting the increasing size and notoriety of the modern
workers’ rights movement).
31
Claire Thornton, Generation Z Workers Push for $15 Minimum Wage as Congress, Biden Debate
Pay for All Americans, USA TODAY (Feb. 16, 2021, 9:57 AM), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2021/02/13/minimum-wage-15-pay-law-could-make-differencegen-z-workers/6720428002/ [https://perma.cc/7BD4-EJ3F]; Minimum Wages for Tipped Employees,
U.S. DEP’T LAB. (Jan. 1, 2022), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/state/minimum-wage/tipped
[https://perma.cc/QN6Z-2MEM].
32
See Timothy M. Mulvaney & Joseph William Singer, Essential Property, MINN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 25) (on file with author).
33
Id. at 25–26.
34
Id. at 25.
35
See, e.g., JEFFREY CLEMENS, CATO INST., MAKING SENSE OF THE MINIMUM WAGE: A ROADMAP
FOR NAVIGATING RECENT RESEARCH 9 (2019) (noting that “[a]nalyses of . . . recent minimum wage
changes tend to find negative effects” on the generosity of employer-provided health insurance policies).
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punch for workers and those seeking work.36 From their vantage point, this
simply is the law of supply and demand at work in the normal operation of a
free market.37
II. A MOST BASIC PRIMER ON
ARGUMENT–COUNTERARGUMENT STRUCTURE
The previous Part broadly summated the standing opposition to
compulsory terms in property as an affront to individual freedom and as a
paternalistic intervention that ultimately will end up hurting the very parties
that the imposition of those terms was designed to protect. The no-frills
nature of this critique can suppress just how jarring it is: if we take this
critique to its logical end, we should jettison so many of the compulsory
terms that currently exist throughout property law. Yet the extent of that
project, upon a mere brief reflection, is remarkable. Such an effort would
require discarding not only those compulsory terms already broached
herein—including the implied warranty of habitability and the minimum
wage—but also the likes of the mandatory contributions that allow Social
Security and Medicare to exist, the service requirements demanded of
commercial establishments by public accommodations laws, the assetdistribution measures that assure that one party to a marriage is not left
destitute upon death or divorce, the accessways afforded by easement law in
the event of a sales contract that landlocks a parcel, and the numerous
provisions that must be included in mortgages in the wake of the subprime
mortgage crisis, to name just a few.
While some may question particular compulsory terms on this list, it is
not evident that many people would endorse the breadth of the jettisoning
effort just described.38 Yet given the widespread reticence toward eliminating
many existing compulsory terms in property relations, it bears exploring in
future work whether there are root causes beyond a conscious sympathy with
the substantive arguments presented in Part I that explain why there exists
36
See Navid Ghani, The Impact of Minimum Wage on Small Businesses, Workers, and Employment
in the United States, 6 INT’L J. HUMANS. & SOC. SCI. 1, 2 (2016) (“The increase in minimum wage can
also have drastic effects on the economy. If minimum wages increased to $15 or more as are suggested
by many, Americans will see a substantial increase in unemployment rates and product prices.”).
37
Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q.
470, 470 (1923) (explaining how proponents of this view describe it as merely allowing for “the natural
working of economic events”).
38
See, e.g., Frank Newport, Social Security and American Public Opinion, GALLUP (June 18, 2019),
https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/258335/social-security-american-public-opinion.aspx
[https://perma.cc/XNZ3-FJD5] (noting a 2014 survey for the National Academy of Social Insurance
found that 77% of respondents agreed that it is critical to preserve Social Security even if it means
increasing taxes, which was consistent with a 2018 Pew Research Center poll finding 74% answering
affirmatively).
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such ardent opposition from so many to new compulsory terms that
specifically target resource inequities related to rental housing, wages, and
beyond.39 However, the remaining two Parts of this Essay—Parts II and III—
leave these questions surrounding any such nonsubstantive causes of this
opposition to another day in an effort to concentrate on confronting the
principles that constitute the opposition view on substantive grounds.
Part III articulates understandings of freedom, paternalism, and markets
that are alternative to those undergirding the current opposition to
compulsory terms. In so doing, it sets forth a counterargument framework of
sorts that offers insight into the contexts within which compulsory terms
might well be prudent. This framework—and it is but a framework that is in
need, of course, of substantial elaboration and refinement in future work—
offers the possibility of moving discourse away from generalized
predispositions and toward contextualized justification. In going back to first
principles in this way, it bears noting, the framework not only presents an
opportunity to reemphasize why property law is rife with compulsory terms
and to advocate for new such terms, but also presents the reciprocal prospect
of deeming some existing compulsory terms—perhaps including even some
of those mainstays set out above—ripe for the dustbin.
First, though, this Part—Part II—attempts to situate, if only highly
summarily, the approach taken herein as motivated by a series of canonical
contributions to argument–counterargument structures. In a world in which
even many proponents of compulsory terms in property conceive of such
terms as paternalistic interferences with individual freedoms (consider, for
instance, the discourse on mask mandates impacting employer–employee
and merchant–consumer relations on commercial properties over the course
of the COVID-19 pandemic40), invoking the background insights of this
structuralist literature offers the prospect of reconceiving of these terms in a
more welcoming, justificatory light. Of course, to synthesize in a few short
39

Have, for instance, too many of us taken existing compulsory terms for granted to such an extent
that we have pushed the various justifications for each of these terms to the corners of our minds and
thereby allowed the standing opposition to take hold nearly unabated in the discourse regarding new
compulsory terms? Alternatively, is there something about certain types of property interests (such as the
right to charge rent or to pay wages) that instinctively prompts us to immunize them from all but the most
nominal of compulsory terms? Or might we have some kind of unexamined predisposition in favor of
certain kinds of parties (for example, those who take out mortgages to buy housing) over others (those
who rent housing)?
40
See, e.g., Caitlin Huey-Burns & Adam Brewster, More Democratic Governors Ease Mask
Requirements: “We Have to Learn to Live with COVID,” CBS NEWS (Feb. 10, 2022, 8:23 AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/covid-mask-requirements-democratic-governors/
[https://perma.cc/
Q2LQ-7U5M] (quoting New York Representative Sean Maloney, chairman of the Democratic
Congressional Campaign Committee, as he praised New York Governor Kathy Hochul’s lifting of the
indoor mask mandate on commercial properties, noting it was “time to give people their lives back”).
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paragraphs the sheer titanic work of the legal realism and critical legal
studies movements upon which the argument–counterargument structure
relied herein is indebted is in some ways a fool’s errand. The depth of the
debt, though, is too extensive not to at least identify several of the
quintessential pillars of this work.
Among the many viable loci from which to start, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes’s critique of the conceptualist approach to legal reasoning seems
especially suitable. In 1894, Holmes explained that a decision to recognize a
privilege to compete or a right to be free from the harms of competition rests
not on any neutral principle of property but on an assertion of social policy. 41
Two decades later, Professor Wesley Hohfeld generalized this critique in
deeming law as consisting of a series of the aforementioned relational pairs,
including, as in Holmes’s illustration, the correlatives of (1) privilege and
no-right and (2) right and duty.42 Hohfeld’s insights brought into clearer
focus the reality that state engagement in the property system is, indeed,
omnipresent. Respecting a privilege to compete by failing to recognize and
enforce a right to be free from the harms of competition is, indeed, just as
much a state choice as recognizing and enforcing that right. 43
Beginning with his classic 1923 article, Coercion and Distribution in a
Supposedly Non-Coercive State, and over the course of several decades to
follow, Professor Robert Hale elaborated on the principles articulated by
Holmes, Hohfeld, and their adherents in noting that property law reflects a
compendium of regulatory choices about the instances in which owners can
41
See Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1894)
[hereinafter Holmes, Privilege]; see also Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REV. 457, 466 (1897) (asserting that there is no neutral principle to determine whether one neighbor can
block another’s access to light and air).
42
See Hohfeld, Judicial Reasoning I, supra note 8, at 16 (setting forth a series of relational pairs in
law and depicting “their individual scope and application in concrete cases”); Hohfeld, Judicial
Reasoning II, supra note 8, at 710 (expanding on the relational pairs). Under Hohfeld’s framework, if one
individual holds a specific entitlement (a right, privilege, power, or immunity), then the other person
involved in that relationship holds the opposite of that entitlement (correlatively, a duty, no-right, liability,
or disability). For a sample contemporary application, consider the well-known dispute in Jacque v.
Steenberg Homes, Inc., in which a residential construction company sought to drive across Jacque’s
barren field to deliver a mobile home to Jacque’s neighbor. 563 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Wis. 1997). The court
found that Jacque held the right to exclude Steenberg Homes from accessing Jacque’s field, such that
Steenberg Homes had a correlative duty not to interfere with Jacque’s exclusionary right (and whereby
Jacque could file a lawsuit to enforce that right upon Steenberg Homes should the company breach that
duty). See id. at 159–60. However, a pilot may have the privilege of accessing Jacque’s airspace above a
certain altitude, in which case Jacque would have no-right to enforce against the pilot. For a similar
discussion of this contemporary illustration of Hohfeldian principles, see Timothy M. Mulvaney, A World
of Distrust, 120 COLUM. L. REV. F. 153, 155 n.9 (2020).
43
Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
711, 751–53 (1980) (praising Hohfeld for his critique of the distinction between the public and
private realms).
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impose harms and nonowners can be secure against them.44 These choices,
Hale explained, naturally have distributive effects and, therefore, form the
context—by establishing parties’ bargaining power—for market exchange.45
Holmes, Hohfeld, Hale, and others associated with the early days of the
realist movement did not simply shine light on lawmaker discretion; they
undercut the very idea that there is an identifiable realm of private property
in which individual operatives engage free from state power and influence.46
In the wake of the realists’ upending of legal thought regarding
property, how were parties in conflict over resources to advocate for their
preferred policy choices, and to what arguments might the state turn in
resolving those conflicts? In the mid-twentieth century, Professor Karl
Llewellyn famously cast statutory construction arguments along two
typecast lines of discourse, which he labeled “thrust and parry.”47 In the
1970s and 1980s, Professor Duncan Kennedy built upon and extended
Llewellyn’s framework in asserting that legal argument writ large rests on a
series of reactive and predictable “bites” and “counter-bites.”48 For a simple
illustration, consider how oceanfront landowners might claim that a rule
precluding beach access across privately owned land regardless of the
circumstances is prudent given its ease of administration, while beachgoers
might answer that a reasonable access standard offers needed equitable
flexibility.49 In this illustration, ease of administration is the bite, equitable
flexibility the counter-bite.50
Kennedy deemed these bites and counter-bites as of “equal status as
valid utterance.”51 To critics in some corners, Kennedy’s framework leaves
the very idea of legal decision-making a matter of “radical subjectivity” and

44

See, e.g., Hale, supra note 37, at 471–72; ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC
CONTROL OF PRIVATE GOVERNING POWER 294–95 (1952); see also Morris R. Cohen, Property and
Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 21 (1927).
45
See Hale, supra note 37, at 470–72; MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 164 (1992); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of
American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1233 (1985).
46
See Peller, supra note 17, at 901 (explaining the realists’ efforts to characterize the public–private
divide as fallacious).
47
See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950).
48
Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, in COLLECTED COURSES OF THE ACADEMY OF
EUROPEAN LAW 309, 327–29, 352–53 (1994) (asserting that arguments for or against a given resolution
to a legal dispute come in series of oppositional pairs).
49
See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Walling Out: Rules and Standards in the Beach Access Context, 94 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1, 22 (2020).
50
Id. at 4–23; Kennedy, supra note 48, at 328.
51
Kennedy, supra note 48, at 327.
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thus impossibly indeterminate.52 On this interpretation, when decisionmakers rest their decisions on specific bites or counter-bites, they ironically
are operating mechanically in a way that limits the prospects of
transformative legal discourse on social issues.53 In the face of these and like
critiques, contemporary progressive property scholars have turned to what
Professor Joseph William Singer calls “critical normativity” in ways that
advance Kennedy’s contribution in important respects.54 In understanding
bites and counter-bites as graded categories dependent on contextualized
norms (rather than stock claims that merely reflect the law’s general
contradictory commitments), this work emphasizes the roles of culture and
persuasion in ethical debate.55
According to this contemporary school of thought, law is not the mere
exchange of argument bites and counter-bites but a forum for normative
dialogue about what we value and how we realize those values. Property
laws, as Professor Laura Underkuffler reminds us, reflect allocative choices
on the state’s behalf in the face of competing private claims and differing
personal interpretations of the shared values that property serves.56
Policymakers have to give reasons for their allocative decisions that
members within their particular legal cultures will be persuaded to
understand as plausible and acceptable—if hard to swallow—by reasonable

52
Henk Botha, Freedom and Constraint in Constitutional Adjudication, 20 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS.
249, 256 (2004); see also Sanford Levinson, Escaping Liberalism: Easier Said than Done, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1466, 1470–72 (1983) (book review) (arguing that Kennedy’s framework implies a nihilistic
approach to separating legal decision-making from one’s own moral and political desires).
53
Botha, supra note 52, at 258–59. Kennedy conceded some ground here, noting:

Legal argument . . . seems to be ‘speaking the subject’, rather than the reverse. It is hard to
imagine that argument so firmly channelled into bites could reflect the full complexity either of
the fact situation or the decision-maker’s ethical stance toward it. It is hard to image doing this
kind of argument in utter good faith, that is, to imagine doing it without some cynical strategy in
fitting foot to shoe.
Id. (quoting Kennedy, supra note 48, at 350).
54
Joseph William Singer, Critical Normativity, 20 L. & CRITIQUE 27 (2009).
55
The plethora of prominent works in this vein includes JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT:
THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY (2000); LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY (2003); Eric
Freyfogle, Private Ownership and Human Flourishing: An Exploratory Overview, 24 STELLENBOSCH L.
REV. 430 (2013); Gerald Torres, Taking and Giving: Police Power, Public Value, and Private Right,
26 ENV’T L. 1 (1996); Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009); and Eduardo Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821 (2009).
In addition, see André van der Walt, Property Theory and the Transformation of Property Law, in
3 MODERN STUDIES IN PROPERTY LAW 361, 376 (Elizabeth Cooke ed., 2005), remarking that “a
transformative property theory has to be a normative theory that justifies the balance between stability
and change, in every individual context, on consideration of human values.”
56
Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Property: A Special Right, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1033, 1039–
42 (1996).
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persons in their shoes.57 In turn, advocates must articulate a basis for their
claims and reconcile them with competing claims.
This process of articulation and reconciliation requires thinking
critically and recognizing that most property claims can be undermined in
some way. Such a recognition may encourage some to disengage from debate
on the view that all normative claims are self-serving.58 But according to
Singer, Underkuffler, and like-minded scholars, we cannot fall into that trap
of disengagement. Choices are unavoidable. While we have to be cautious
in judging the claims of others, we simultaneously have to reject claims when
their proponents cannot offer a persuasive justification for why their acts that
are harming others are legitimate.59 It admittedly is paradoxical—we need to
evaluate assertions with a humility that appreciates the possibility that
changing times and conditions may push us to reverse course.60 That is, we
need to be cautious but also have a strong belief in justice. We are, indeed,
“the player and the cards.”61
Today, the standing opposition to new compulsory terms is of such
vitality that the counterposition—the normatively charged counter-bite—has
been suppressed in public discourse in considerable respects.62 As noted in
the Introduction, it is no longer a select collection of conservative libertarian
lawmakers who oppose the imposition of new compulsory terms wholesale;
progressive lawmakers, too, are sounding the alarm against such compulsory
terms.63 In this light, the next Part aims to rehighlight for the public
consciousness a number of key characteristics of circumstances in which
compulsory terms may well be justified on deontological or consequentialist
57
Mulvaney, supra note 49, at 30; see also Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of SelfGovernment, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 34 (1986) (describing a culture of justification as “a communicative
practice of open and intelligible reason-giving”).
58
See Mark V. Tushnet, The Left Critique of Normativity: A Comment, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2325,
2326–28 (1992).
59
See Singer, supra note 54, at 41 (noting that we must see each other as human, which constrains
our own preferences and requires us to consider moral questions from the perspective of the party or
parties who end up on the losing side in the resolution of a dispute between competing claimants).
60
See Jeremy Paul, Searching for the Status Quo, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 743, 785 (1986) (“[T]he
‘problem’ can never be ‘solved.’ . . . [T]hose of us who believe that no question as basic as the relationship
between individual liberty and collective action can ever be ‘settled’ must continue to confront the
opposing arguments.”).
61
See Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J.
1, 8–9 (1984) (asserting that “the absence of determinacy, objectivity, and neutrality does not condemn
us to indifference or arbitrariness” but, instead, “liberates us” to embrace “passionate moral and
political commitments”).
62
See, e.g., Peller, supra note 17, at 920 (asserting that we continue to allow “ideological positions
about a range of issues to appear as rational extensions from commitments to freedom and selfdetermination when they necessarily involve politics, the contingent exercise of social power”).
63
See Cervenka, supra note 6.
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grounds. The nature of a symposium volume unsurprisingly precludes
anything approaching a comprehensive account of the categories of
counterjustification that are at our disposal; however, the hope is that the
broad outlines sketched here will serve as fodder for future work aimed at
recasting conversations centered on whether compulsory terms in property
are justified in any generic sense as conversations centered on whether
specific compulsory terms might be prudent in given identifiable contexts.
III. JUSTIFYING COMPULSORY TERMS IN PROPERTY RELATIONS
The premises underlying the conventional opposition to compulsory
terms—particular conceptions of freedom, antipaternalism, and markets—
cut across different argumentative dimensions. Endorsing a particular
conception of freedom is in sizable respects a matter of moral concern—it is
about the kind of society in which we want to live. Meanwhile, claims of
antipaternalism have both moral and utilitarian dimensions, in the sense that
they both touch on crafting the going conception of freedom and broach the
actual exercise of one’s freedom to engage in exchanges with others. Finally,
those critiques centered on markets as the settings for such exchanges are
predominantly utilitarian in nature. Appraising these premises across their
respective argumentative dimensions in accord with the argument–
counterargument structure outlined above, this Part identifies some of the
key characteristics of those situations in which, contra the conventional
account, compulsory terms may well be justified.
A. Respecting Competing Freedoms
Invoking freedom is not always sufficient to guide the resolution of
competing claims to resources, for it is not in all cases possible to support all
people’s freedom to do with their property what they like all of the time.64
Enhancing one person’s freedom often requires constraining that of
another.65 Consider, for instance, “forced entry” laws, which mandate that
landowners and employers allow employees to carry firearms onto
64
One of the leading legacies of the legal realist movement, of course, is its deconstruction of the
classical conception of freedom. See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV.
553 (1933); Hale, supra note 37; Cohen, supra note 44; Holmes, Privilege, supra note 41; Hohfeld,
Judicial Reasoning I, supra note 8; Hohfeld, Judicial Reasoning II, supra note 8; Walter Wheeler Cook,
Privileges of Labor Unions in the Struggle for Life, 27 YALE L.J. 779 (1917).
65
See Laura S. Underkuffler, Property as Constitutional Myth: Utilities and Dangers, 92 CORNELL
L. REV. 1239, 1252 (2007) (asserting that property is reciprocal in the sense that, for each recognition of
a property interest, there are interests that are spurned); Nadav Shoked, The Duty to Maintain, 64 DUKE
L.J. 437, 453 (2014) (“[I]n a world of limited resources, in which owners are surrounded by other owners,
there is no possible way to secure for all owners the capacity to freely do as they wish with
their property.”).
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workplace grounds.66 In addition to authorizing the transportation and
storage of firearms, these laws regularly provide that said firearms may be
removed from the employees’ vehicles for purposes of self-defense, the
defense of another, or the defense of property without the consent of the
landowner/employer.67
As multiple federal appellate court decisions have made plain, the
Second Amendment does not compel all private property owners to allow
firearms onto their property.68 It follows, therefore, that forced entry laws
reflect a regulatory choice to define and allocate property interests in a
certain way in the face of competing claims. To some employers, compelling
such a term in employment arrangements restricts their freedom to use their
land in a manner that lies outside the shadow of fear cast by employees who
bring loaded firearms to the workplace. From their perspective, employees
bearing firearms hold arbitrary power over their fellow employees and their
employer through intimidation; the holders of such weapons impose their
will on everyone else. On this view, allowing employers to restrict firearm
possession on their land is therefore not only appropriate but necessary to
ensure freedom. Some employees, though, understand forced entry laws to
buttress freedom. In their view, requiring employers to allow employees to
bring firearms onto the work site prevents harm on the theory that
responsible persons with access to their firearms will be able to defeat the
threat of dangerous persons—including those who themselves bear
firearms—harboring ill will.69
66
See Joseph Blocher, The Right Not to Keep or Bear Arms, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012). Twentyfour states have adopted some version of a forced entry law. Jonathan Hancock & Joann
Coston-Holloway, State Guns-at-Work Laws Chart: Overview, WESTLAW: PRAC. L., https://us.
practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/9-521-5091 [https://perma.cc/RN2X-47W7]. Kentucky’s iteration is
typical in declaring that “[n]o person, including but not limited to an employer, who is the owner, lessee,
or occupant of real property shall prohibit any person who is legally entitled to possess a firearm from
possessing a firearm, part of a firearm, ammunition, or ammunition component in a vehicle on the
property.” KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 237.106(1).
67
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 237.106(3).
68
See GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1265 (11th Cir. 2012) (“An individual’s
right to bear arms as enshrined in the Second Amendment, whatever its full scope, certainly must be
limited by the equally fundamental right of a private property owner to exercise exclusive dominion and
control over its land.”); see also Bastible v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 437 F.3d 999, 1008 (10th Cir. 2006)
(concluding that a company “did not unlawfully infringe upon any right of [its employees] in enforcing
its no-firearms policy” when the company terminated employees who transported firearms onto the
company’s property in their vehicles).
69
See Melinda Wenner Moyer, More Guns Do Not Stop More Crimes, Evidence Shows, SCI.
AM. (Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/more-guns-do-not-stop-more-crimesevidence-shows/ [https://perma.cc/CHF3-75HJ] (“[G]un advocates argue . . . that murders, crimes and
mass shootings happen because there aren’t enough guns in enough places. Arming more people will
make our country safer and more peaceful, they say, because criminals won’t cause trouble if they know
they are surrounded by gun-toting good guys.”).
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Ensuring employers’ freedom to live unburdened by a fear of firearms
violence is a course that necessarily limits the employees’ freedom to protect
themselves from harm; likewise, allowing employees the ability to bring
firearms onto workplace grounds is a course that necessarily limits the
employers’ freedom to live unburdened by a fear of firearms violence. It is
not as if one set of these parties’ competing interests is internal to property
and the other set is external. They are both internal to property, and to what
property “protection”—for firearms on one hand and land on the other—
should entail.70
The parties’ competing interests, on this account, are distinct from mere
preferences. Unlike preferences, their interests rest on conflicting
interpretations of a foundational value—freedom—that they share and that
is not easily amenable to aggregation and comparison. It is hard to imagine
that there is a point at which we all will have reflected long enough about the
meaning of freedom that the contours of these parties’ property rights will
be determined definitively in perpetuity; it seems unlikely that we ever
would be able to deduce a resolution of the parties’ competing claims by
turning to some agreed-upon meaning of “freedom.” Resolving this dispute
requires evaluating competing freedoms. It requires deciding whether to
protect the employees’ interest in the freedom of action or the employers’
interest in the freedom to be secure from illegitimate harm. These parties
cannot act—indeed, they cannot exist—free and apart from one another.
They are partners in an interconnective and interdependent social and
economic relationship.
In the face of these types of conflicting property claims and the
competing freedoms that attend them, there must be some mechanism to
define the contours of property interests so as to determine what freedom
entails in various contexts.71 We can gain an appreciation for the mechanism
that we currently employ in the United States by looking back on the
mechanism underlying the system of European feudalism, the vestiges of
which we rejected in the course of the American Revolution. Under the
feudal system, “owners” were defined by their laddered status. Lords and
long-dead ancestors had the power to make what were at times shameful
demands, forcibly linking those of an inferior status together via a complex

70

See UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 55, at 157 (explaining that the resolution of property disputes
necessarily requires value-laden engagement on the question of “what the right to property protection—
as a fundamental matter—should be”).
71
Professor Jennifer Nedelsky terms the product of this definitional exercise “responsible freedom.”
Jennifer Nedelsky, A Relational Approach to Property 10 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
Northwestern University Law Review).
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matrix of fealties (i.e., allegiances, dues, and loyalties).72 These linkages had
the derivative effect of tying most all individuals to their place; these
individuals could not liberally use, sell, borrow, or trade interests in land, for
they were subject to the demands made by those of a superior status, who, in
turn, were ruled by those of a superior status, all the way on up to a king.73
Upon pronouncing unalienable the rights to “Life, Liberty, and the
pursuit of Happiness,” the drafters of the Declaration of Independence
explained that governments must be “instituted” to “secure these rights.”74
Such rights could not be secured without compulsorily precluding property
arrangements characterized by the sorts of unreasonable demands
commonplace in a feudal system that necessarily placed these rights out of
reach for many. Over time, then, we have instituted governments—by
democratically electing representatives—for the purpose of, among other
tasks, making definitional and allocative choices surrounding property that
determine which demands are and are not beyond the pale.75
These representatives cannot simply support “strong” ownership
powers. To ensure that all people have the prospect of becoming owners and
to allow all owners to exercise their ownership powers, all owners
necessarily must be told what their ownership powers entail—how much
waste they can produce before it amounts to harmful pollution, how much
market dominance they can acquire before it is deemed monopolistically
damaging to competitors, whom they can and cannot prevent from entering
into market exchanges and for what reasons, etc. In reflecting these choices,
it is property law that determines the meaning of freedom in the face of
competing freedoms—for example, the freedom of use versus the freedom
from harm—across circumstances.
The individuals whom voters democratically elect to resolve the
competing freedoms presented by the question of whether employers should
72

See, e.g., DAVID CARPENTER, THE STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY: BRITAIN 1066–1284, at
403–07 (2003).
73
See, e.g., Edward Rubin, The Illusion of Property as a Right and Its Reality as an Imperfect
Alternative, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 573, 578–80. This is not to suggest that those parties of inferior status had
no rights that those of superior status respected. Indeed, on many feudal manors, important land use
decisions often were made collectively by tenants.
74
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
75
Timothy M. Mulvaney, Property-as-Society, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 911, 925 (“Respected liberties are
not a pre-established and immutable touchstone of defining and allocating property interests; rather, they
are an outcome of [the] democratic process of making policy choices among the varying potential answers
to difficult questions through the formulation of property laws in the face of new circumstances and
information.”); Timothy M. Mulvaney & Joseph William Singer, Move Along to Where? Property in
Service of Democracy, in TRANSFORMATIVE PROPERTY LAW 1, 20 (G. Muller, R. Brits, B.V. Slade & J.
van Wyk eds., 2018) (“Democracies do not serve property rights; property rights serve
democratic values.”).
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be mandated to allow employees to carry firearms onto workplace grounds
have many options for defining the meaning of ownership in a manner that
resolves such a case. Perhaps, for instance, the employees’ ownership of their
firearms should be defined as subject to an obligation to abate the harm to
their employers if the employees can do so at the lowest cost; alternatively,
perhaps the employers’ ownership of land should be defined as subject to an
obligation to tolerate low-grade impacts of their employees’ use of their
personal property on that employer’s land. However, because defining
ownership with respect to one of the parties necessarily has the effect of
limiting the ownership claims of the other, the state cannot, out of respect for
freedom, choose not to define ownership.76 This is so because what may be
thought of as inactions—i.e., choices to repeal or not enforce existing
regulations or to refrain from adopting new ones—naturally have their own
defining effects in the face of conflicting interests.77 The question, then, is
not whether the state should interfere with property interests but, instead,
how the state should define property interests in a given context.78
Conceiving of property laws as interfering with freedom prevents us
from understanding the state’s unavoidable responsibility of structuring the
social and economic environment within which we can exercise our freedom.
No bargains that are reached between individuals are, in actuality, wholly
detached from public decisions on how to define and allocate property
interests. These definitional and allocative choices determine the extent to

76
Laura S. Underkuffler, The Politics of Property and Need, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 363,
370 (2010) (“No societally recognized and enforced property right, which is ‘normatively neutral,’
actually exists.”); Eric T. Freyfogle, Property and Liberty, 34 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 75, 84 (2010) (“There
is, in truth, no morally neutral place for [property] law to hide.”). Other rights, such as free speech, are
not “rivalrous” in this sense. For example, recognizing an individual’s speech right is unlikely to deprive
others of their ability to speak; that is, with speech, scarcity is absent. Underkuffler-Freund, supra note
56, at 1039; see also Cohen, supra note 44, at 13 (“[D]ominion over things is also imperium over our
fellow human beings.”). Indeed, property’s rivalrous nature helps explain why John Locke so wrestled
with the task of justifying individual appropriations of nature’s commons: such appropriations would
deprive all others of their preexisting rights to the commons. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT § 25 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett 1980) (1690).
77
See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Non-Enforcement Takings, 59 B.C. L. REV. 145, 172–73 (2018);
Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 544 (1985); see also Kennedy,
supra note 12, at 649 (asserting that a decision-maker “should be damned if he doesn’t as well as damned
if he does”). For example, a refusal to compel a habitability warranty in residential leases reflects a choice
to enforce a lease under which a tenant can be evicted for nonpayment of rent even if there are rats in the
rafters, the doors will not lock, and the toilet will not flush.
78
M. Witmark & Sons v. Fred Fisher Music Co., 125 F.2d 949, 963 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J.,
dissenting) (“Laissez-faire does not mean that the State has given up most of its ‘interferences,’ but that
the State is used to ‘interfere’ in new ways at the demand of individuals.”).
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which we are free to make our own choices because they determine the
power we have to demand things of others.79
It follows that any firm delineation between a public realm and a private
realm sheds little light on our property system. Markets do not arise out of
thin air; they are established by the collective choices to define and allocate
property interests in certain ways and not others. Unequal distributions of
resources, therefore, are not merely the result of private exchanges but lie on
the backs of myriad state choices to define property rights in ways that create
entitlements and correlative exposures.80 There is no conflict between
subverting and protecting individual choices; rather, the focus is on debating
the contours of the society in which we want to live. Property rights cannot
be explained as the mere result of bargains between freely engaging private
parties. If property laws were different from the status quo, the bargains
reached by private parties would be different because those laws distribute
entitlements and, thus, bargaining power in different ways.81
B. Confronting Antipaternalism
The foregoing discussion on conceptions of freedom is naturally moral
in nature. A claim of antipaternalism, though, has both moral and utilitarian
dimensions. While there are, of course, interplays between these two
dimensions, this Section endeavors to address them separately and in turn.
Across each dimension, it suggests that describing the imposition of
compulsory terms writ large as “paternalism”—much like conceptualizing
compulsory terms as interfering with freedom—conceals the role that the
state necessarily plays in creating a platform for the development of social
and economic relationships that are compatible with democratic norms.
1. Paternalism and Morality
The standing opposition to compulsory terms in property relations is
premised on the idea that all people have a sufficient amount of resources
that others need, such that they can use those resources in markets to make
fair deals to acquire what they need for themselves. If no such deals are out
there, the implicit assumption—on the standing view—is that everyone has

79
Cohen, supra note 44, at 12–13 (describing property as consisting of delegations of public power
to private parties).
80
See generally Hohfeld, Judicial Reasoning I, supra note 8, at 47 (explaining that a liberty is a right
created by law with a correlative duty to not interfere with that right as enforced by public officers);
Hohfeld, Judicial Reasoning II, supra note 8, at 717, 725–32 (recognizing that rights, outside of natural
rights, are given meaning and effect by law); Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 43, at 760 (explaining
society establishes legal entitlements and that, upon doing so, it necessarily creates correlative
legal exposures).
81
Hale, supra note 37, at 478; HALE, supra note 44, at 385–99.
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what they need. The problem lies in the reality that everyone does not have
what they need. Some people must accept deals as they are offered to them,
even if those deals perpetually prevent them from amassing enough
resources to deal with others on any moderately fair terms. Freedom is empty
if one does not have sufficient resources to exercise it.82 A lack of alternatives
constrains the choices people make, to the extent that, in certain cases, the
only options available to some people come with burdens that no person in
a morally just civil society should have to bear.
Consider, for example, how the argument that the landlord will raise the
rent upon the imposition of a compulsory habitability warranty rests on the
view that both landlords and tenants have the ability to pay for what they
want. In actuality, the distribution of property at the outset of contract
negotiations dictates the power relationship between the parties.83 In the
event that distribution is unjust, an arrangement reached on the open market
may not be best characterized as one that maximizes the parties’ legitimate
interests but instead as one party—the landlord—unjustly exploiting the
other’s—the tenant’s—marginality.84 For an even more dramatic example,
consider the types of sharecropping arrangements that proliferated in the
South after emancipation. The formerly enslaved ostensibly agreed to pay
“rent” to their old “masters”; however, the rent was often higher than the
value of the seed, food, and wages they received, keeping them in perpetual
debt and tied to the land like feudal peasants.85 They simply did not have
enough resources with which to bargain and thus were forced to accept this
horrid arrangement.86

82
HANOCH DAGAN, A LIBERAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 42 (2021) (discussing the imperative that all
people share an “entitle[ment] to own some autonomy-enhancing property”); GREGORY S. ALEXANDER,
PROPERTY AND HUMAN FLOURISHING 9 (2018) (contending that every person is entitled to the resources
necessary to allow them to chart their own course, for “every person is equally entitled to flourish”);
Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REV. 295, 302 (1991) (noting
that “anything a person does has to be done somewhere”).
83
Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139, 170 n.125 (2005)
(“The association between property and compensatory power is so simple and direct that in the past it has
been considered comprehensive.” (quoting JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE ANATOMY OF POWER
47 (1983))).
84
On marginality, see AJ VAN DER WALT, PROPERTY IN THE MARGINS (2009).
85
EDWARD ROYCE, THE ORIGINS OF SOUTHERN SHARECROPPING 175 (1993) (explaining that,
“[w]ithin a decade of the abolition of slavery,” sharecropping had evolved “into an oppressive debtpeonage system”).
86
Id. at 11 (“Even if the final transactions leading to sharecropping agreements consisted of
voluntary choices made in a free-market setting . . . [i]t would still be necessary to assess the extent to
which the terms under which planters and freedpeople bargained with one another at this final point (e.g.,
relative market power, access to resources, availability of alternatives) were themselves set by
market forces.”).
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Where the bargaining power of the parties is lopsided in light of an
unjust original distribution, there is no surety that compulsory terms make
the parties collectively worse off. Some relationships, such as slumlord–
tenant and “master”–sharecropper, endorse a way of life that is inconsistent
with membership in a political system in which every human life matters. It
makes no difference that those who enter into such relationships meet
whatever test of voluntariness is applicable to other types of relationships,
for no person with the power to reject such relationships would agree to
accept the vulnerabilities they present. Compulsory terms can do the prework
of legitimizing the power relationship between the parties, only after which
just market exchanges can occur. From this perspective, compulsory terms
do not give parties rewards they cannot reap in the marketplace; they put
parties in a position to reap just rewards in the marketplace.
The stakes are especially high in determining which relationships are
off the table, for no amount of empirical evidence is apt to convince parties
who want to enter into these subprime relationships that they are
fundamentally morally wrong. But perhaps it is because the stakes are so
high that the state, in a society riddled by political divisions, is best
positioned to represent our collective, pluralist commitments in this regard.
In other words, perhaps it is the political realm that is the more rational space
for determinations of this sort, in that decisions made therein are based on
moral reflections about the types of social relationships that befit humanity.87
The market realm is the more irrational on this score, for it rests on the
objectionable assumption that we should take the extant distribution of
property interests—and, thus, economic power—as a given and determine
how important select resources and interests are to people by looking
exclusively at how much money people are willing to fork over for them.88
Should enslaved persons have to pay for their emancipation? Should
tenants have to pay for the assurance that the ceiling will not collapse on their
babies’ cribs? It may be that the answers to these questions respecting
relationships of these natures are today so self-evident to so many that the
questions themselves do not occur to us. But it bears reflecting on the broader
reality that the legitimate social relationships that we often take for granted
as constitutive of the market realm are not naturally occurring but, instead,
are the product of the political realm. Regulations enacted in the political
realm do not rest atop the market model; the market rests atop the foundation
87
There are, of course, powers of emphasis in both realms—economic powers in one, political
powers in the other.
88
Joseph William Singer, Jobs and Justice: Rethinking the Stakeholder Debate, 43 U. TORONTO L.J.
475, 492 (1993) (“Imagine, for example, that workers had no protection against being beaten on the job;
they might very well agree to work without job security in order to obtain the right not to be beaten.”).
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that the regulations in the political realm establish.89 Markets depend on rules
that the market itself often is incapable of establishing.90 We express our
needs and desires in the market realm, but those expressions are layered on
top of the expressions of our needs and desires that we make in the political
realm. It is in the political realm that we have the ability to take some
relational possibilities off the table because they are inconsistent with living
in dignity in a civilized democracy.91
That the legitimacy of social relationships is determined in the political
realm becomes clearer upon reconsideration of the recent assertion set out in
the Heritage Foundation report noted in the Introduction above that many
workers “are not yet capable of contributing” more value to their employers
than the annual wages that an employer must pay a full-time employee
working at a $15 minimum wage.92 This assertion makes the compulsory
term—the minimum wage—out to be a constraint on an employer’s freedom
to pay the lowest wage that capable workers will accept on the market. It
therefore assumes that, if workers really wanted higher wages, they would
seek to bargain for those wages and, where due, succeed in securing them.
This position fails to recognize the possibility that prevailing wages
exist not because they reflect bargains that both employers and employees
consider just, but instead because the power structure concretized by
prevailing property rules does not ensure the realization of a just bargain. If
individuals are working hard but not earning enough to live on, it may be
that their employers are making money off of their labor but not providing
them with the resources they need to be able to provide that labor.93 Because
in these cases the employees’ labor is necessary to make the profits their
employer takes, these employers take too much if they make money via
practices that do not ensure that those whose services are necessary to their
success are able to earn enough to continue to provide those services while
meeting their own dignified lives’ basic necessities. To reverse a common
trope, the employees are making what the employers are taking through the

89
Joseph William Singer, Things that We Would Like to Take for Granted: Minimum Standards for
the Legal Framework of a Free and Democratic Society, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 139, 150 (2008).
90
Robert Kuttner, The Miracle of Bidenomics, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 13, 2021),
https://prospect.org/economy/miracle-of-bidenomics/ [https://perma.cc/3LR9-P9EA] (“All markets
depend on rules—rules defining property rights, liability risks, unfair market practices.”).
91
Singer, supra note 88, at 494 (“Legal rules structure the contours of the relationships within which
bargaining occurs . . . . Legal rules shape the contours of the social relationships that comprise the form
of social life to which we are committed.”).
92
See Rachel Greszler, Biden’s Covid Stimulus Plan to Double Minimum Wage Will Hurt the People
He Wants to Help, NBC NEWS (Feb. 3, 2021, 12:04 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/bidens-covid-stimulus-plan-double-minimum-wage-will-hurt-ncna1256547 [https://perma.cc/4X5L-LLLM].
93
See Mulvaney & Singer, supra note 32, at 30.
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law’s enforcement of low-wage contracts that workers, despite deserving
otherwise, have no choice but to take.94
From this perspective, a legitimate minimum wage need not necessarily
be interpreted to paternalistically limit the freedom of employers; instead,
such a minimum standard could be interpreted as rejecting employers’
coercive powers and recognizing the freedom of workers to secure a wage
worthy of their contributions to the lives of their employers.95 It is
conceivable that a minimum wage might thwart the creation of an
arrangement between an employer and a worker freely willing to accept a
substandard wage. But a minimum wage can provide workers with a
threshold that, despite whatever they are willing to accept, is commensurate
with what they are entitled to collect. These minimum standards are a
declaration—an evaluative assertion—about the types of social relations that
are out-of-bounds in our democracy; they determine the issues about which
employers and employees can and cannot legitimately negotiate and
compete.96 They are restrictions on the freedom to exploit and oppress in an
effort to secure the freedom to participate in a just employment market in
which a human being can garner wages sufficient on which to build a
dignified life.
2. Paternalism and Utility
As the preceding Section asserted, describing the imposition of
compulsory terms writ large as “paternalistic” conceals the reality that the
state must determine the relationships that are morally consistent with a free
and democratic society before individuals are in a position to state their
social and market preferences. It also, though, turns a blind eye to the reality
that, in a number of circumstances, compulsory terms can both satisfy
people’s social and market preferences as they are and satisfy what would be
people’s preferences if they had the benefit of hindsight.
94
Ben Craw & Zachary D. Carter, Paul Ryan: 60 Percent of Americans Are ‘Takers,’ Not ‘Makers,’
HUFFPOST (Oct. 5, 2012, 3:42 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/paul-ryan-60-percent-ofa_n_1943073 [https://perma.cc/8YW2-8XAM]. Employers who pay substandard wages also take from
third parties—family, charity, government, etc.—who have to sustain these underpaid employees to
enable them to work for these employers. See Mulvaney & Singer, supra note 32, at 32. For more on
external effects, see infra Section III.C.4.
95
See Christopher J. Flinn, Minimum Wage Effects on Labor Market Outcomes Under Search,
Matching, and Endogenous Contract Rates, 74 ECONOMETRICA 1013, 1014 (2006).
96
Joseph William Singer, Democratic Property: Things We Should Not Have to Bargain For, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PRIVATE LAW THEORY 221 (Hanoch Dagan & Benjamin C. Zipursky eds.,
2020) (“Not every property arrangement can be justified by reasons that are compatible with democratic
norms and values . . . . Within those democratic constraints, people are free to create new types of
property rights and to use contractual relationships to share and limit those rights in ways that serve
human interests and needs.”); id. at 222 (“Our property rights . . . set the stage for our exercise
of freedom.”).
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a. Satisfying preferences
As this Section explains, compulsory terms can satisfy people’s social
and market preferences as they are in circumstances in which (1) expense,
time, and lack of expertise make it unlikely that parties will be able to
conceive of or desire to negotiate for what are today routine, socially
expected conditions, or (2) collective action problems predominate.
With respect to the former, it is expensive, time-consuming, and
downright difficult to think of everything we would have to negotiate for in
the absence of compulsory terms. Consider, for instance, the prospect of
reaching an agreement with a builder to construct a modern home if there
were no building codes devised by people with expertise in architectural
stability, water, electric, gas, HVAC, and the like.97 Many people may well
want the compulsory terms of building codes so that they do not have to
worry about the possibility of a new home or that of a neighbor going up in
flames because the electrician cut corners. They may well want to be able to
take for granted that, when a person walks into that new home, the sockets
in the bathroom are grounded, rather than bear the responsibility to bargain
for such peace of mind upon entry. It also may be true that a select few would
prefer that the issue of whether a bathroom socket is grounded be on the
bargaining table rather than set in stone at the outset. That preference,
though, dashes the expectations of everyone else who buys or enters any
home. One of these groups—either those who expect safe wiring or those
who would prefer to negotiate for it—will be imposing its will on the other.
An increase in freedom for some is always a decrease in freedom for others.98
Compulsory terms can assume that conditions will reflect what most people
want to take for granted.99
As for the latter, compulsory terms need not be construed as
constraining free choices; compulsory terms can be understood as restoring
free choices that the prior regulatory regime had thwarted by allowing certain
power relationships to develop and persist. We might assume, for instance,
that if employees wanted to work in an environment in which their co-

97
The exemplar of building codes highlights what in some cases is a special haziness of the line
between laws that compel terms in property-related contracts and laws that more generally regulate
business or other activities. Building-code requirements, after all, apply not only in instances in which
homeowners and building contractors enter into contracts but also in instances in which landowners
decide to engage in repairs or new construction with their own hands. The existence of this haziness does
not detract from the arguments outlined in the text, but instead merely suggests that they may have
application beyond the confines of what this Essay construes as compulsory terms in property.
98
Paul Spicker, Why Freedom Implies Equality, 2 J. APPLIED PHIL. 205, 205 (1985) (“Freedom is a
redistributive idea, implying that the freedom of some must be restricted to increase the freedom of
others.”).
99
Cf. Singer, supra note 89.
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workers were required to wear masks to prevent the spread of COVID-19,
they would have bargained for it, and that, since they did not bargain for such
a safety precaution, they must not value it. Yet consider things from the other
side: if it is the case that compulsory terms interfere with the intentions of
contracting parties, it must mean that minimum safety requirements prevent
workers from realizing their wish of securing jobs that may pay a bit more
but at which they are especially vulnerable to disease. If we assume that most
workers want relatively safe jobs, perhaps we should reconsider the baseline
and assume that employers should have to bargain for the right to expose
their workers to unmasked colleagues. The point, here, is that if employers
would not be inclined to bargain for that right to expose their workers to a
highly contagious deadly disease were they not afforded it at the outset (i.e.,
in economic parlance, the workers’ asking price significantly exceeded the
employers’ offer price), perhaps we should not actually afford it to them at
the outset.100
Many employers did not provide these relatively safe jobs in the peak
stages of the COVID-19 pandemic because they had the power not to. One
potential reason they have the power not to provide these jobs is the
collective action problem. For instance, consider Starbucks’s decision to lift
its self-imposed mask mandate in the spring of 2021.101 Starbucks employees
might each have individually preferred in the moment that their colleagues
and customers continue to wear masks in the face of emerging variants of
the virus, but would not negotiate for that mandate for fear of being undercut
by those willing to work without it. In this instance, the high transaction costs
of getting all of the workers in a room to share their preferences blocks the
expression of those preferences. In this sense, a law that sets a compulsory
masking requirement may not be paternalistic at all. In these circumstances,
such a term would not override most persons’ individual choices; instead, it
would merely reflect the actual costs of hiring workers by producing the

100
In some sense, this position parallels the claim that those with insufficient market power may not
be able to register their legitimate preferences in the marketplace: money is of decreasing marginal utility,
such that granting an entitlement to a poorer person may offer greater utility gains than granting it to a
relatively wealthier person, even though the latter would be willing and able to pay more in absolute
dollars for the entitlement were it sold at auction.
101
Mary Meisenzahl, Some Starbucks Employees Are Angry over Mask Mandates Lifting, While
Others Are Eager to End Customer Confrontations, BUS. INSIDER (May 17, 2021, 12:24 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/starbucks-lifts-mask-mandates-and-workers-are-divided-2021-5
[https://perma.cc/Z6A9-MAPY].
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outcome to which the parties would have agreed absent the transaction
costs.102
b. Satisfying would-be preferences
There certainly are times when compulsory terms do indeed preclude
people from getting what they, at least in the moment, say they want, even
when alternatives are available. But in some of these cases, the government
really does know better.103 Mill’s fantastical take that we are in all
circumstances the best judges of our own welfare is belied by the reality that
we are quite often mistaken in our judgments as to what is in our best
interests.104 We regularly do not think to include contractual provisions (that
our landlords include a grace period for rental payments), underestimate the
risk of our own failures (that we can sell shares in a condominium Ponzi
scheme), think in the instant rather than longer term (that we can comport
with the obligations of a mortgage when the rates will spike markedly after
the lapsing of an initial low-rate term), and trust sellers to act reasonably
rather than stand on a legal right to commit unfair treatment (that we will be
able to assign the remaining term on our lease when a job transfer requires
us to move across the country).105 That we make mistakes in judgment does
not imply that we are unintelligent; rather, it simply reveals that rational
thought is inherently imperfect.106 In some cases, choice architectural tools

102
Kennedy, supra note 12, at 575. Kennedy cautions that efficiency arguments of this nature that
surmise what parties would have accomplished absent transaction costs suffer from a manipulability in
the sense that they require factual assumptions for which empirical evidence is inherently unavailable. Id.
at 597–99 (asserting that interventions to compel job security terms are more colorably justified on
distributivist or paternalist grounds, rather than efficiency grounds).
103
Id. at 634 (“[T]he decisionmaker has to take the beneficiary under his wing and tell him what he
can and cannot do.”).
104
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 21–22, 430–31 (2011) (explaining the various
ways in which individuals predictably make judgments that diverge from their own best interests);
RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH,
AND HAPPINESS 19 (2008); Robert Charles Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86 YALE
L.J. 1, 18–20 (1976) (“Human finitude and normative error are the major sorts of personal imperfections:
human beings have limited capacities to understand, to reason, and to predict, and they do not always
know or choose the risks that under some moral theory they ought to prefer . . . . [But] since fallibilistic
theories strike many persons as an insult to human dignity, inevitably there is pressure to disguise these
theories when they do underpin regulation.”).
105
Kennedy, supra note 12, at 626–28.
106
Peter de Marneffe, Avoiding Paternalism, 34 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 68, 80 (2006). There are, of
course, reasons for not acting to correct these mistakes. For instance, perhaps it is best for the parties to
suffer the consequences of a mistake. Alternatively, perhaps we are mistaken about whether a mistake
was actually at hand at all—maybe it was not a mistake but rather part of a strategy that we failed to
understand. Or, even if the compulsory term did fend off a mistake, the saved party may be so aggrieved
by the intersubjective judgment that generated that term that such an intervention is socially unforgivable.
Kennedy, supra note 12, at 640–41.
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may be an appropriate antidote to these imperfections.107 In other situations,
though, in which evidence over time suggests that these mistaken judgments
are both especially likely and especially detrimental, the state’s imposing
compulsory terms may well be in our best interests.108
C. Promoting Just Markets
The standing opposition to compulsory terms rests on the assumption
that such terms necessarily end up hurting the people they were designed to
benefit by impeding bargains. Yet it is not possible to predict with
confidence what consequences will result from the imposition of a
compulsory term in any general sense. The consequences depend on the state
and structure of the market for that resource, as well as the state and structure
of the market for the myriad resources that are interrelated thereto. In some
instances—be it, as the following examples attest, as a result of cost
neutralizing effects, the elasticity of supply and demand, the interactions of
complementary policies, or impacts on third parties—compulsory terms may
well be justifiable measures to achieve consequentialist aims.
1. Neutralized Costs
There are circumstances under which the costs of a compulsory term
may be neutralized by derivative behavioral changes. For instance, raising
the minimum wage may well have no discernible impact on net employment
and production (particularly where it is coupled with indexing the minimum

107
See generally Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1161–62 (2003) (asserting that rules should be chosen to improve
the welfare of people by steering them in the direction of making better choices for themselves); Richard
H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 175, 175, 178 (2003)
(“Would many object to putting the fruit before the desserts at an elementary school cafeteria if the
outcome were to increase the consumption ratio of apples to Twinkies?”). Thaler and Sunstein’s work
has spawned a venerable cottage industry of legal and economic scholarship on the virtues, vices,
impressions, and misimpressions of choice architecture. The many prominent critiques include Gregory
Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1245 (2005); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165 (2003); Mario J. Rizzo &
Douglas Glen Whitman, The Knowledge Problem of New Paternalism, 2009 BYU L. REV. 905 (2009);
Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws,
and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1033 (2012); and On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble,
Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs Law and Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098 (2008).
108
For example, there is empirical evidence that a sizable percentage of people who earn enough
income or have enough wealth-creating opportunities to save for retirement on their own nonetheless do
not do so. See, e.g., Annamaria Lusardi, Explaining Why So Many People Do Not Save 12 n.13 (Ctr. for
Ret. Rsch. AT Bos. Coll., Working Paper 2001-05, 2001), https://crr.bc.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2001/09/wp_2001-05.pdf [https://perma.cc/GWH7-CLQQ]. This evidence lends some
support to the view that the state’s imposition of a Social Security system may well be in the best interests
of the public.
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wage to median wages moving forward109) where it makes higher paid
employees—buttressed by a now-higher morale and self-worth—less likely
to seek greener pastures.110 In turn, employers’ expenditures on increased
wages are offset as worker productivity increases when workers remain in
their positions for longer periods and expenditures on training and
administrative onboarding for new workers are reduced.111
2. The Elasticity of the Supply and Demand Curves
When the costs of compulsory terms are not neutralized, the extent to
which the cascading distributive effects will inure to the benefit or detriment
of a given party will be dependent on the shape of the supply and demand
curves in the relevant market.112 If, for example, the demand for housing in a
given community will remain despite even a dramatic price increase while
the slightest decrease in price will generate a marked decline in supply,
landlords will pass on the bulk of the costs of a compelled habitability
warranty to their tenants.113 If, however, the demand for housing in a given
community will drop sharply at the slightest price increase while even a large
109
Ben Zipperer, Gradually Raising the Minimum Wage to $15 Would Be Good for Workers, Good
for Businesses, and Good for the Economy, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Feb. 7, 2019),
https://www.epi.org/publication/minimum-wage-testimony-feb-2019/ [https://perma.cc/ANY5-L7HR].
110
Under certain conditions, a minimum wage hike could negatively impact the number of people
employed. See, e.g., Kevin Freking, Alan Fram, & Josh Boak, CBO Finds $15 Minimum Wage Would
Reduce Poverty, Increase Federal Debt, PBS NEWS HOUR (Feb. 8, 2021),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/cbo-finds-15-minimum-wage-would-reduce-poverty-increasefederal-debt [https://perma.cc/K8YF-NUCU] (describing a recent report of the Congressional Budget
Office predicting that more than doubling the federal minimum wage of $7.25/hour to $15/hour would
contribute to some modest increase in unemployment). The contention here is only that an increase in the
unemployment rate does not inevitably result from the passage of a minimum wage increase.
111
Paul Krugman, Liberals and Wages, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/07/17/opinion/paul-krugman-liberals-and-wages.html [https://perma.cc/9TXS-37YC]; Juliana
Kaplan, A $15 Minimum Wage Would Barely Hurt Business and Be Life-Changing for Many Workers,
BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 8, 2021, 3:17 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/what-a-15-minimum-wagewould-mean-businesses-workers-employment-2021-1 [https://perma.cc/7SUB-ZJJD] (quoting Ben
Zipperer, an economist at the Economic Policy Institute, as asserting that “yes, it is true that when you
raise the minimum wage employers hire fewer low wage workers, [but] on the other hand, the factor
that’s really offsetting that is that, even though employers are hiring fewer workers, fewer workers are
leaving their jobs”).
112
Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in BuyerSeller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361, 361 (1991); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1483 (1989) (suggesting that it is hard to use a compulsory term to
redistribute when the distributive effect depends on “the characteristics of the buying and selling
classes”). Professor Martha McCluskey has noted the folly of referring to the provision of economic
security as “redistribution” in the sense that “those rights become implicitly . . . suspect and subordinate.”
Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neoliberal Attack on the
Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783, 787 (2003). She advocates for “moving egalitarian economic protections
from the margins to the center of citizenship.” Id. at 875–76.
113
Kennedy, supra note 12, at 605–06.
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price decrease will generate only a very minor reduction in supply, landlords
will bear the bulk of the cost of the warranty.114 The shapes of these curves
will be dependent in important respects on how compulsory terms are
defined and the extent to which they alter the distribution of power and
wealth between landlords and tenants on the front end.115
3. A System of Regulation
In circumstances in which the costs of compulsory terms are passed on
to those parties for whom the terms were designed to benefit, those costs may
be offset not only by the benefits of the compulsory terms themselves but
also by the benefits of other policy changes. For example, a term that
compels landlords to allow tenants to have visitors in their units may, like a
habitability warranty, lead landlords to raise rents under certain conditions,
in light of the costs such a term can pose with respect to privacy, liability,
wear and tear, and the like on the landlords.116 However, this possibility is
not necessarily a reason to shy away from compelling the term. Costliness,
alone, cannot serve as a justification to reject a given regulation; if it did,
most all regulations would be on the chopping block, for regulations—
allocations of property interests amidst competing claims—almost inevitably
impose costs. The costs of a given regulation must be balanced against the
benefits of that regulation—including the benefits of that regulation as that
regulation operates within the larger system of regulation that allows for and
governs market exchanges.
Indeed, the extent to which compulsory terms can be effective is almost
always contingent on the extent to which they are considered in concert with
other policies. For example, even if in isolation the costs to landlords of
allowing tenants to host visitors somehow outweigh the benefits of doing so,
it is still not evident that the best way to help the poor is to allow landlords
to make rental housing visitor-free.117 We can, instead, decide that a property
114

Id. at 605; Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing
Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093, 1101–10 (1971). The
distributivist must be cautious, for while the seller will in this hypothetical instance bear the bulk of the
cost of the warranty, there will be a small class of prospective tenants who would bear the remainder (and
whose loss is necessary to benefit tenants writ large). Should this group of tenants be the slice about
whom—because of their extreme impoverishment—the distributivist is most concerned, even a
compulsory term that substantially redistributes from landlords to tenants generally may not serve the
specific objective sought. Id. at 613.
115
See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 722
(1988) (explaining that allowing employees to purchase a plant upon its closing is less likely to inure to
the employees’ benefit than giving them continuing access to the company’s financial figures so they can
exercise their purchase option upon an informed assessment of whether the plant is being managed in a
reasonably competitive way).
116
State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971).
117
See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, NO FREEDOM WITHOUT REGULATION 76 (2015).
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owner who chooses to enter the residential rental market must comply with
a minimum standard relating to visitors and, if housing prices become out of
reach for certain prospective tenants as a result of that minimum standard,
consider counteracting that result with other policies that help the poor attain
housing, such as subsidizing rent or childcare or increasing wages and access
to jobs that provide suitable wages.118
4. External Effects
Even in cases in which two parties would prefer to enter into a
transaction that waives a compulsory term, there are instances in which the
term may be needed to prevent harms to those who are not party to that
transaction. Consider, for example, the mortgage requirements enacted in the
wake of the housing crisis of 2008–2009 that seek to prevent a repeat of an
economic recession that put many—including many who were not direct
parties to subprime mortgagor–mortgagee relationships—out of their homes
and work. The argument that borrowers and investors should be able to take
risks if they truly want to do so—for example, agreeing to risk-intensive
mortgage terms with which both parties know the borrowers are unlikely to
be able to comply—is not especially convincing when we consider both the
third parties that those perilous wagers harm and the third parties—family,
charity, government, etc.—that step in to mitigate those harms.119
118
Likewise, if raising the minimum wage will lead to reduced employment under certain market
conditions—a phenomenon that the most prominent recent economic research rejects, at least on the scale
of minimum wage increases that are the subject of current political discourse in the United States—that
is not necessarily a reason to reject such a raise. Regulations do not operate within individual bubbles.
They are part of a system. Raising the minimum wage, even if doing so reduces employment in a given
context, can be combined with other steps to offset those reductions. A substantial body of writing takes
on the underlying assumption that increases in the minimum wage necessarily lead to reduced
employment. See, e.g., Paul Wolfson & Dale Belman, 15 Years of Research on U.S. Employment and the
Minimum Wage 15, 49 (Tuck Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 2705499, 2016) (reviewing thirty-seven
studies on the U.S. minimum wage in the past fifteen years and reporting employment elasticities with
respect to the minimum wage as having a mean estimate of -.06 and a median estimate of -0.03; i.e., a
negligible impact on employment resulting from minimum wage increases); Sylvia Allegretto, Arindrajit
Dube, Michael Reich & Ben Zipperer, Credible Research Designs for Minimum Wage Studies: A
Response to Neumark, Salas, and Wascher, 70 ILR REV. 559, 590 (2017) (concluding that minimum
wage studies that employ quality modeling find no or a very limited negative impact on employment
resulting from minimum wage increases); Ben Casselman, Cutoff of Jobless Benefits Is Found to Get Few
Back to Work, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/20/business/economy/
unemployment-benefits-economy-states.html [https://perma.cc/5QK6-P3M4] (finding that, as of the fall
of 2021, states that had cut some or all of their COVID-19-pandemic-related benefits experienced slightly
slower job growth than states that had maintained their benefits).
119
For another example, consider the many grocery store owners who desired for their patrons to
have the choice of whether to wear a mask and the many patrons who desired to go without one despite
the high risks of COVID-19 transmission in various phases of the pandemic. Though both these owners
and patrons were comfortable with the no-mask choice, a compulsory term requiring that patrons wear
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Of course, the more broadly we define externalities, the more
compulsory terms will be justifiable on efficiency grounds.120 Indeed, as
Kathleen Sullivan has explained, if moral offense to third parties is
considered an external cost, then a great number of compulsory terms
conceivably may pass utilitarian muster.121 The point here, though, is simply
that we would need to ignore all externalities to justify the rejection of
compulsory terms across the board.
CONCLUSION
The state’s imposition of compulsory terms in property relations may
well promote unfairness, result in inefficiencies, or alter individual choices
that are better left unaltered. This Essay has called into question, though, the
resonant stance that such an imposition inherently is accompanied by one or
more of these untoward effects. In outlining some of the key characteristics
of those circumstances in which compulsory terms may well be justified on
deontological or consequentialist grounds, the Essay seeks to generate
momentum toward a renewed discourse that eschews knee-jerk opposition
to compulsory terms in property in favor of one that engages with the
rationales for and against such terms in a context-sensitive fashion.

masks may nonetheless have been appropriate in this situation because of the external costs generated by
the owners’ and patrons’ preferred arrangement. Perhaps most significantly, these external costs included
putting the immunocompromised at risk of a deadly virus. If the impulses of these owners and their
patrons who do not want to wear masks are widespread in a community, the ability to acquire a necessary
item of personal property—food—would be determined by the extent to which people are or are not
immunocompromised.
120
See, e.g., Bailey Kuklin, Self-Paternalism in the Marketplace, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 649, 685–86
(1992) (“[T]hose subject to negative externalities from the purchased goods may . . . become better off,
as from safety measures. The effects, both positive and negative, of the mandatory warranty ripple out to
dependents (e.g., spouses and children) and supporters (e.g., parents and friends), to workers in directly
impacted industries (and their dependents and supporters), [and] those involved with markets that feel the
result of reallocating resources . . . .”).
121
Sullivan, supra note 112, at 1482; see also Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1112
(1972) (discussing such an argument in the context of third parties taking moral offense to A’s sale of a
kidney to B).
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